



Economic Tools for WDM

- What impact in the Mediterranean?

2nd Mediterranean Water Forum

Regional Workshop on Water Demand Management in the Mediterranean

Murcia, Spain, November 25th 2014

Shaping sustainable futures



Overview

- What are we speaking about? Costs, prices and value of water
- Absence of efficient markets for water
- Different nature and purposes of water tariffs and taxes
- Water pricing for different uses: domestic, industrial, agricultural
- Prioritizing solutions: the ‘Cost curve’
- Case studies /application of economic instruments for WDM
 - Drinking water pricing with a national level perspective (Sonede, Tunisia)
 - Pricing structure for irrigation water (Jordan)
 - Subsidization of water-saving irrigation techniques (Morocco)
 - Water markets (Spain)
 - Payments for environmental services (NYC)

Costs, values, prices and tariffs of water

“Water as an economic good”

■ Cost of water:

- technical,
- economical,
- social, and
- environmental components

NB *Economic* externalities are assumed to be measurable, contrary to *environmental* externalities

Environmental Externalities		Full Economic Cost	Full Cost
Economic Externalities			
Opportunity costs			
Capital Charges	Full Supply Cost		
O & M Cost			

Cf. private cost vs. social cost

■ Value of water:


- Direct use value: as a **final** consumption good for domestic water; consumers' **utility**
- Direct use value: as an **intermediary** consumption good for commercial, industrial, tourism and agricultural water; producers' surplus (i.e. **net revenue**)
- Indirect use value (livestock watering, micro-hydroelectricity, tourism)
- Non use value/intrinsic value: amenity value

Intrinsic Value		Economic Value	Full Value
Adjustment for Social Objectives			
Net Benefits from Indirect Uses			
Net Benefits from Return Flows			
Direct Value to Users of Water			

Cf. private value vs. social value

Producers' and consumers' optimization behaviors

- **Marginal costs increase** with amount of water mobilized
(the more the water mobilized, the costlier the incremental unit of water)
- **Marginal returns** (utility, or revenue) **decrease** with amount of water consumed or used
(the more the water consumed or used, the lesser the utility felt or revenue perceived from the incremental unit of water) – decreasing returns to scale




Quantities produced and consumed in response to market price signals

Aggregated surplus and market efficiency

An **efficient market** generates prices allowing an optimal resource allocation i.e. **maximizing total surplus** through 'decentralized' (individual) decision-making

....under certain **strict conditions**



Is there an efficient market for water?

Yes?
No X

Does this hold true in the real water world?

- Water generally a **public good** – at least, not a strictly private one
- Concept of demand not applicable to **vital needs** for domestic water supply and sanitation
- **Market failures** : presence of **externalities** and irreversible effects (groundwater extraction); issues of **public goods funding** (e.g.. watershed protection) **natural monopolies** (big size networks with constant returns to scale)
- **Uneven repartition, scarcity, transport difficult and costly** => markets, if any, would be segmented


- **Private and social costs and benefits are not equivalent**
- **Free availability criterion not met**

=> **Public intervention**: regulation of water allocation and use, quality standards, investment financing, public monopolies in storage, transport and distribution

- Not 'economic' prices but second best **administered prices** i.e. **Tariffs**
- On what grounds? Efficiency/Equity/Sustainability

Tariffs, taxes and subsidies are of different nature/serve different purposes

Cost recovery
Water for all
Sustainability
Others



Practical example: "There should be two taxes on pianos: one in favor of the state, the other to the benefit of neighbors" (Courteline, a French playwright)



Costs, values, prices and tariffs of water


“Water pricing”, or: setting an optimal tariff

(which means: “as least sub-optimal as possible”)

Domestic water
(and sanitation)


Industry and tourism
Commercial uses

Agricultural water
Economic/social purposes




Extra charges for social or environmental purposes may be added

Economic approach to choices in water supply/mobilization/savings




Pricing structure for drinking water (Sonede, Tunisia)



- **Success:** wide coverage (100% in urban areas, 93% in rural areas, out of which 50% for Sonede-operated facilities); reduced consumption as a result of raising tariffs for high consumers
- **Challenges:** targeting of the poor (nearly all urban domestic consumers are subsidized; fixed service fee significantly increases cost to low consumers); financial sustainability


Pricing structure for irrigation water services (Jordan Valley Authority)



- Quotas are the main instrument-subject to revision by JVA in situations of water stress
- Tariffs raised in 1997 with block tariff system
- Individual meters initially installed but rapidly deteriorated without remediation
- No shift to more water-efficient crops as originally expected
- No evidence of the role of tariff in improved water efficiency (from 57% in 1994 to 70% in 2000)
- Irrigation tariff is always only part of the story


Pricing structure for irrigation water services (Jordan Valley Authority)-ctd

NB: willingness to pay for irrigation water is much higher than current rates- Some export farms desalinate their own water at a cost up to 17 times higher than the rate applied to small producers



- Tariff is a mere tool for setting the level of an intended transfer to agriculture esp. to small farmers
- Instrument of social policy for an overall non-competitive sector – the social cost of maintaining agriculture
- Shift to higher value-added crops, if desired, should be encouraged not only by raise in tariff but also through development of opportunities and support/extension activities including risk management and specific support to small farmers

Water Markets (Spain)



- Exchanges of water use rights, and associated institutions, are **rooted in history**; formalized in 1990s
- Today: exchanges are **direct** (private bilateral contracts) or **intermediated**: public centers – established 1999 – esp. for resource management or environmental purposes
- **Within or across water basins** although for similar uses, subject to approval by WBA
- **(Very) limited volumes; prices higher than irrigation tariffs** in large irrigation areas
- Drawbacks: **concentration** in 'rich', highly productive areas/in the hands of already well-off agents; **market asymmetry** in favor of sellers; still **lack of flexibility** for exchanges between different uses; **vested interests** of management bodies and agents ('Public Choice' theory)
- **Potential for economically efficient WDM** (savings on costly supply/storage solutions) provided clarified/secured **use rights** and transparent/smooth **market functioning**

Payment for Environmental Services

(ex. NYC and the Catskills watershed, Vittel)

Upstream agriculture conducive to resource degradation (soil, water)

- *Users being within their rights* -

Externalities



Impacts of degradation on municipal water supply and quality

=> *Three ways to address externalities: (theoretically equally efficient)*


- *Laws and regulations* - *No*

- *Environmental taxes (Polluter Payer Principle)* - *No*

- => *Direct bargaining between agents* (known as “the Coase theorem”)

Potential **supply** for conservation based on **consent to receive** in compensation of opportunity costs

Internalization



PES

Potential **demand** based on **willingness to pay** for opportunity costs of conservation as preferred to more **costly alternatives**

*Conditions: 1) well defined **property rights** (regardless of the initial allocation of property)*

*2) **opportunity costs** < **cost of alternatives** so as each party can get a profit from the exchange*

Different situations:

- *Transaction Costs = 0 => strict Coase conditions* - *OK*



- *Real world: **TC** > 0 => intermediation bodies (e.g.. **Water Basin Agencies** through subsidization of pollution reduction and resource management)*

Conclusions: contribution and potential of economic instruments for WDM

- **Mixed** results and achievements so far:
 - Mainly focused on contribution to **cost recovery and access to drinking water**
 - **Better use of water for agriculture** through subsidization of water saving irrigation techniques
 - Less good at **saving water**
- But do not throw the baby out with the bathwater
- **Get basic incentives right**: first, carefully **review subsidies** including outside water sector (energy, agriculture) – tackle ‘perverse’ subsidies with harmful effects on water resources
- **Clarify purposes and objectives**: you cannot have your cake and eat it
- **Go further with already efficient instruments**: in particular, consider raising tariffs for **commercial uses** of water with high marginal value, **aquifer withdrawals** and **recreational domestic uses** with high **willingness (or capacity) to pay**
- **Think about - and test - innovative instruments**: water markets, payments for environmental services, groundwater management contracts




Think outside the water box!



- No instrument works alone; mix instruments and have them embedded within sound sectorial and economic policies; make use of full set of public policies

- Assess, monitor and evaluate



- Do not feel relieved from governance issues (information, metering, control, water policing, appropriate decentralization): governance is essential



Thank you for your attention!

Shaping sustainable futures